Post-conflict aid, real exchange rate adjustment, and catch-up growth by Elbadawi, Ibrahim A. et al.
POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONS WORKING PAPER NO. 3 
 
Post-Conflict Aid, Real Exchange Rate Adjustment, and Catch-up Growth (*) 
 
 
Ibrahim A. Elbadawi 
Development Economic Research Group 





Development Economic Research Group 










Post-conflict countries receive substantial aid flows after the start of peace. While post-conflict countries’ 
capacity to absorb aid (i.e., the quality of their policies and institutions) is built up only gradually after 
peace onset, the evidence suggests that aid tends to peak immediately after peace is attained and decline 
thereafter. Aid composition broadly reflects post-conflict priorities, with large parts of aid financing 
social expenditure and infrastructure investment. While moderate RER overvaluation is observed in post-
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strongly during post-conflict periods. Because RER misalignment reduces growth, RER overvaluation 
during post-conflicts reduces catch-up growth. Aid and RER overvaluation combined also lower growth. 
However, the negative growth effect of RER overvaluation declines with financial development. 
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Countries coming out of civil wars usually have large needs, both humanitarian and 
developmental. Therefore, aid or Official Development Assistance (ODA) can play an 
important role in the post-conflict reconstruction of these economies, as well as in 
consolidating peace and reducing risks of future conflicts. And because of the large 
potential for catch-up growth in post-conflict countries, their economies tend to have high 
absorptive capacities and aid can be potentially very effective, even with modest 
improvements in the institutional and policy environments. However, aid-recipient 
countries would need to spend aid wisely, which would require not only good economics 
but also good politics. The latter is important because the same cleavages that underlie 
civil wars are likely to be at work after the end of conflicts. Therefore both good 
economic management and strong political processes, relying on transparency and 
accountability, will be needed for aid to be effective in post-conflict experiences. Donors 
also have to do their part for this potential to be realized for a long enough period to 
allow these countries to return to normalcy. Aid delivery mechanisms must promote 
ownership, transparency, and wide stakeholder participation in the development process. 
 
The latter are well-known issues in the aid effectiveness literature and have already 
attracted considerable academic and policy interest. This paper, however, addresses other 
issues regarding the impact of large ODA flows – a typical post-conflict phenomenon – 
on the real exchange rate (RER) and on growth. In this context we will address the 
following questions: what have been the time profile and composition of ODA during the 
post-conflict cycle? Has post-conflict aid been associated with disequilibrium real 
exchange rate appreciation? How serious was RER misalignment in post-conflict and 
how much of RER misalignment is explained by large post-conflict aid flows? What 
impact does RER misalignment, especially extreme real exchange rate overvaluation, 
have on growth and aid effectiveness? 
 
As an economy-wide relative price influencing inter and intra-temporal expenditure and 
resource allocation decisions, the real exchange rate has a potentially important influence 
on export growth, export diversification, and economic growth.
 1 In turn, ODA is a key 
determinant of the RER, through its influence on domestic spending and saving 
decisions. The more aid is spent, the larger is spending on non-traded goods and services, 
and the larger is the share of aid that is saved to build up net domestic-currency public-
sector assets, the larger is the ensuing RER appreciation, with potential negative effects 
on output and employment – the so-called Dutch disease.  In this context, excessive aid 
dependence could have a detrimental impact on non-traditional exports and thus 
undermine an effective source of dynamic growth. 
 
                                                 
1 The real exchange rate concept adopted here is reflects the economy-wide relative price of non-traded to 
traded goods, proxied by real effective real exchange measures. A rise (decline) in the latter means an RER 
appreciation (depreciation). The RER is judged to be misaligned when it diverges from its equilibrium level 
(ERER), where the latter is derived from a behavioral model that accounts for equilibrium in the non-traded 
goods markets as well the inter-temporal implications of current account sustainability. The misaligned 
RER is characterized as overvalued (undervalued) when the actual RER is larger (smaller) than its 
corresponding equilibrium level.  
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The central role of the RER is confirmed by evidence suggesting that protracted RER 
overvaluation tends to be associated with lower economic growth.
2  And, given that 
overall economic activities might be partially boosted by an overvaluation-driven 
growth in the non-tradable sector, the impact may be particularly harmful to export 
growth and economic diversification,
3 especially if export production is characterized by 
learning-by-doing externalities and capital market imperfections as in the cases of non-
traditional and especially manufacturing exports.
4 In addition, the level of the real 
exchange rate affects competitiveness directly, through the return to investing in traded-
goods industries, and indirectly, by influencing exploitation of comparative advantage.
5  
Although it may not be of immediate concern to low-income post-conflict countries, 




Section 2 analyzes the size, timing, and composition of post-conflict aid during the post-
conflict cycle, as well as ODA-RER correlations, in a sample of 32 countries and with 
more detailed focus on 7 country cases. Section 3 reports estimation results for the RER, 
based on a world sample of 83 countries and annual 1980-2004 data, focusing on the role 
of aid on the long-term RER behavior. This allows subsequently to derive measures of 
RER misalignment for different sub-periods in the pre and post-conflict cycle and to trace 
the influence of large aid flows on RER overvaluation in post-conflicts. Section 4 reports 
estimation results for growth, based on a world sample of 78 countries and 5-year data 
spanning from 1970 to 2004.
7 The growth specification allows testing for the influence of 
the post-conflict cycle, foreign aid, and RER misalignment on growth, controlling for 
standard growth determinants and allowing for key interactions between post-conflict 
periods, aid, RER misalignment, and financial development. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Aid and Dutch Disease during Post-Conflicts 
 
Post-conflict countries tend to experience substantial surges of aid flows, which have 
potential consequences for their competitiveness and growth behavior. To understand the 
latter, we start by reviewing briefly the basics of aid management and its implications for 
the RER. 
 
The receiving government faces two basic choices in its use of aid: it can spend or save it. 
One extreme for the government is to spend aid fully, increasing its non-aid public deficit 
accordingly. If government spending falls entirely on traded goods (for example, on 
imports of school computers and textbooks), the trade deficit and hence the non-aid 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Edwards (1989), Cottani et al. (1990), Ghura and Grennes (1993), Razin and Collins 
(1997), Easterly and Levine (1997), and Aguirre and Calderón (2005).   
3 See, for example, Nabli and Veganzsones-Varoudakis (2002) and Elbadawi (2002).    
4 See, for example, van Wijnbergen (1986).  
5 This problem has been extensively documented in the case of Africa by, among others, Elbadawi (2002), 
Mengistae and Pattillo (2004), and Dufrenot and Yehoue (2005).   
6 See, for example, Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Merrill Lynch (1998). 
7 The RER model can only be estimated for the shorter period (1980-2004) because the error-correction 
panel estimation methodology requires full data availability.  However, the estimated model can be used to 
construct indexes of RER equilibrium and RER misalignment for the longer 1970-2004 period.  
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current account deficit rise by the magnitude of the aid inflow. In the latter case, aid is 
fully absorbed, the resource transfer from abroad to the recipient economy is complete, 
and the RER is likely to appreciate by little, if anything. By contrast, if aid is fully spent 
by the government on non-traded goods (for example, labor-intensive social services or 
reconstruction of domestic infrastructure), absorption of aid is very limited (the non-aid 
current account changes by little), but the RER is likely to appreciate significantly.       
 
The other extreme choice for the government is not to spend aid but to save it, by 
building up its net asset position, which typically is weak after the end of conflict. In this 
case, the government can use aid by increasing its own or the central bank’s international 
reserves or by reducing public-sector debt. Debt reduction can be implemented by 
amortizing outstanding public debt or reducing new debt flows – in both cases the 
government uses aid to strengthen its debt position, avoiding an increase in government 
spending or a reduction in government revenue. If the government decides to increase 
international reserves or reducing foreign debt, the RER appreciates by little, if anything. 
However, if the government uses foreign-currency aid to pay back domestic-currency 
denominated domestic debt – an operation equivalent to a central bank sterilized forex 
intervention – the corresponding private-sector portfolio shift could lead to RER 
appreciation. 
 
The latter description is simple because it abstracts from an explicit discussion of private-
sector reaction, financial-market features, and monetary and exchange-rate policy 
considerations.
8 However, it identifies the main factors that determine the RER response 
to government use of foreign aid: spending vis-à-vis saving, the sector composition of 
government spending, and the currency composition of public saving. RER appreciation 
will be larger the more governments spend, the larger is the share of spending falling on 
non-traded goods, and the larger is the share of public-sector saving falling on net 
domestic-currency assets.      
 
The RER appreciation leads to private-sector expenditure switching from traded to non-
traded goods and resource allocation from traded to non-traded production sectors, 
further widening the current-account deficit. Resource allocation may be slow and costly, 
leading to temporary but protracted reduction in aggregate output and employment. The 
decline in exports and traded-goods production due to the loss in international 
competitiveness may lead to lower productivity gains – often concentrated in traded-
goods activities and particularly in export sectors – lowering economic growth. This 
result – termed Dutch disease – has often been associated to commodity price booms but 
may also be observed during post-conflict aid surges – a central issue of this paper.   
                                                 
8 IMF (2005) and Aiyar et al. (2005) provide a discussion of the accounting features and qualitative aspects 
of the macroeconomics of foreign aid. The appropriate way to analyze the macroeconomics of aid is by 
using a dynamic general-equilibrium framework, with explicit modeling of endogenous private sector 
expenditure, resource-allocation, and portfolio reactions to government spending and saving decisions in 
response to aid, giving rise to endogenous determination of the current account, the real exchange rate, 
domestic interest rates, risk premiums, and portfolio composition, as well as all relevant sector prices and 
quantities. Moreover, a general equilibrium framework is also the suitable way to address the problems of 
aid additionality and resource fungibility, by allowing to spell out explicit counterfactuals. However, a full 




Much of the literature on Dutch disease deals with the macroeconomic and growth effects 
of commodity discoveries and price booms. From a theoretical point of view, the change 
in the composition of output from traded to non-traded sectors has ambiguous effects on 
growth in the long run. Van Wijnbergen (1984) and Krugman (1987) suggest that the 
effects of foreign resource inflows depend on the magnitude and persistence of the 
inflows. If the commodity resource flow is sufficiently prolonged, traded-sector 
competitiveness is reduced and production of non-commodity traded goods will suffer. In 
contrast, Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that the negative growth effect will be 
temporary and in the long-run growth will not be affected. More recent empirical 
evidence tends to conclude that the effects of abundant resource inflows depend on 
institutional development and the corruption and rent-seeking behavior elicited by the 
resource inflows. Spatafora and Warner (1999) show that in a sample of 18 oil-exporting 
countries, the RER appreciation led to an enlarged non-traded sector, but there is no 
evidence of a contraction of the traded-goods sector. In contrast, Sachs and Warner 
(1999) find that per-capita GDP declined or remained constant after the discovery of 
natural resources. The implication of the literature on resource booms is that post-conflict 
governments receiving aid surges have reasons to be concerned about potential aid-
induced RER appreciation that may damage competitiveness and growth prospects. 
 
Some important findings and policy implications are noted by the expanding academic 
and operational literature on aid effectiveness in post-conflict experiences.
9 In evaluating 
government use of aid, Barder (2006) notes that there are limits on “aid absorption”, 
which might explain why the costs of aid increase faster than its benefits. Collier and 
Dollar (2002) find that aid effectiveness is subject to diminishing returns, but the 
absorptive capacity of aid-receiving countries is primarily explained by the quality of 
their policies and institutions. 
 
More generally, the choice between spending and saving foreign aid by recipient 
governments is shaped by a large number of country and post-conflict specific factors. 
The latter choice implies balancing the needs of quick spending – including humanitarian 
aid delivery, restoration of social spending, and infrastructure reconstruction needs – and 
the benefits of saving much of aid – including building up government asset positions, 
avoiding Dutch disease, and spending more slowly in accordance with estimated 
permanent aid flows. The latter economic factors are complemented by domestic 
political-economy considerations, the quality of domestic policies and institutions, and 
donor conditionality imposed on aid disbursement. 
 
Considering the latter diverse economic and political factors that shape aid 
spending/saving decisions, it is an empirical matter of how post-conflict countries have 
dealt with aid flows. We will assess this empirical evidence by analyzing the experience 
of a significant sample of post-conflict aid-recipient countries and highlighting a few 
specific country cases. 
 
                                                 
9 See for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Clements, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004), Addison (2003), 
Kang and Meernik (2004), Weiss (2004), IMF (2005), and Schwartz et al. (2006).   
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Our sample covers 36 post-conflict countries for which the ending years of conflicts 
range from the 1960s to the 2000s. In order to identify periods of conflict along with the 
start and end dates of wars, we use the definition of civil war and the data presented in 
Sambanis (2004) and PRIO (2005).
10 The literature suggests that in the ten years 
following the end of conflicts, growth follows a fairly robust pattern. The capacity of 
these economies to absorb aid effectively also increases over the post-conflict cycle 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2002).
11 We closely follow the latter authors in defining three post-
conflict sub-periods, to which we add a pre-peace period (prior to the end of conflict) to 
allow for a more comprehensive comparison. Hence we define the conflict cycle as 
follows, where year 0 indicates the year when peace is attained:  
 
•  PrePeace {yr(-4),.., yr (-1)}: covers the four years prior to the year of peace 
•  PeaceOnset {yr(0), yr (1)}: covers the first two peaceful years, including the year 
when peace is attained 
•  PostConf1 {yr(2),.., yr (5)}: covers the following four peace years  
•  PostConf2 {yr(6),.., yr (9)}: covers the subsequent peace years. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes aid flows during the post-conflict cycle for the median conflict 
country. Post-conflict countries receive larger aid with the start of peace. The median 
Official Development Aid (ODA) rises from 4% during PrePeace to 5% in PeaceOnset, 
with a relapse to 4% during PostConf1 and PostConf2. The corresponding rise in per-
capita aid is about US$ 6 per capita per year between PrePeace and the six years after 
peace (PeaceOnset and PostConf1).
12 Generally ODA tends to peak early, during the 
PeaceOnset period. However, the quality of policies and institutions of conflict countries 
improves, at least modestly, with the start of peace. According to the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the corresponding quality indicator 
rises somewhat after peace for our median conflict country, suggesting an improved 
capacity to absorb aid. 
 
Humanitarian or emergency aid tends to be more erratic, depending on the extent of 
country-specific emergency situations. Examples of large humanitarian receipts include 
the cases of Mozambique after the natural catastrophe in 2000 and Rwanda after the 1994 
genocide, where humanitarian aid attained more than $0.15 per capita. For the median 
country in our sample, emergency aid grew exponentially in the post-conflict period, 
from $ 0.09-0.10 during PrePeace and PeaceOnset to $0.15 during PostConf1 and $ 0.41 
during PostConf2. 
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that during PeaceOnset the economy is likely to 
experience only a moderate rise in growth and the capacity for absorbing ODA is likely 
to be limited. In contrast, during PostConf1 and PostConf2 growth picks up and the 
capacity of aid absorption also grows. The peak of aid during PeaceOnset and its 
                                                 
10 Appendix A presents a list of conflict countries with the date(s) when the conflict(s) ended. 
11 See also Elbadawi (2006) for an analysis of the case of post-conflict Sudan. 
12 By these estimates, a median country of 30 million people receive roughly US$180 m. per annum more 
in aid after peace than with what it received before the end of conflict.  
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subsequent decline during years 2-9 after the start of peace stands in contrast to the 
gradual rise in absorptive capacity and in growth observed over the post-conflict decade.  
 
Our evidence suggests that donors may provide too much aid too early and reduce aid 
flows too quickly, just when post-conflict economies are ready to absorb more aid. Donor 
decisions regarding ODA allocation to post-conflict countries are determined by several 
factors, most notably poverty, although their aid decisions are often dominated by their 
sheer political interests (Kang and Meernnik 2004). For example, donor countries that 
intervene militarily in a conflict, whether to aid or defeat a regime, are likely to emerge as 
the most important contributors to post-conflict relief and reconstruction efforts. Political 
transition is another important determinant. Donors tend to be more generous to countries 
that are likely to implement a democratic transition as part or consequence of the peace 
process. Aid is also likely to be higher the larger are trade relations or other bilateral 
economic interests between donor and recipient countries. These considerations may lead 
to important cross-country differences in aid patterns. 
 
What is the composition of aid and its evolution over the post-conflict cycle and does it 
reflect the development priorities of post-conflict periods, such as the need for service 
delivery in education and health or rebuilding infrastructure? There is some consensus 
that aid in post-conflict settings ought to be broad-based and pro-poor (e.g. Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002). It has been argued that the scope for rapid reform is greater in post-
conflict settings and therefore there is less need to limit reform to a few interventions 
with rapid payoffs. Also, due to the high risk that post-conflict countries may return to 
war, peace-promoting policies have to be supported early on. Moreover, unless policies 
are explicitly pro-poor, reconstruction efforts risk to being narrow, benefiting mostly the 
elite. If legitimate employment prospects and wages are depressed, demobilized ex-
combatants will face few job opportunities other than continuing war and crime, while 
economic hardship will strengthen demagogues in exploiting ethnic rivalries and political 
tensions, thereby undermining peace itself (Addison, 2003).    
 
To underscore the importance of embedding economic reforms in a broad-based 
economic and political agenda, consider the debate on the recent Sudanese post-conflict 
Poverty Reduction Strategy
13, which attempts to achieve the two overarching goals of 
consolidating peace and reducing the risks of future wars, as well as making a lasting 
impact on poverty and make progress on other Millennium Development Goals 
(Elbadawi, 2006). Because of the complexity of the political landscape precipitated by 
the war, as well as the awareness generated by it, there is a consensus in Sudan that 
achievement of widely shared growth is an important development target, for addressing 
accumulated historical horizontal inequities along regional, ethnic, and gender lines. The 
concept of “widely shared growth” is articulated in the strategy through an explicit 
identification of the various types of political and economic exclusions as a source of 
poverty, deprivation, and conflict. Moreover, the strategy also recognizes that the 
achievement of widely shared growth would require political accountability and good 
economic governance, especially with regard to management of oil resources and aid 
                                                 
13 Adopted by the Sudan’s Government of National Unity following the peace agreement last year, which 
ended Africa’s longest civil war.  
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effectiveness.  In turn, political accountability and prudent economic management must 
be underpinned by a social-economic contract, anchored by broad-based political 
participation and support from the international development community. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the allocation of aid across different sectors during the post-conflict 
cycle. The distribution of aid shows that aid allocated to infrastructure tends to dominate 
during the pre-peace period and remains significant in post-conflict. Social sectors (i.e. 
education, health, water and sanitation) normally receive large amounts of aid in all three 
post-conflict periods and receive much more than all other sectors during PostConf1 and 
PostConf2. In the two latter periods, the productive sector accounts for over 10% of total 
aid, followed by budget support and government and institutions. Therefore aid 
composition reflects broadly post-conflict priorities, especially with regard to prioritizing 
social and infrastructure sectors. 
 
While post-conflict economies are usually highly aid-dependent, the vast majority did not 
experience major RER appreciation after the start of peace – as will be illustrated for 
selective country cases below. If anything, conflict countries actually experienced long 
spells of RER depreciation, despite surging aid flows. This may reflect prima facie 
evidence that Dutch disease is not widespread in post-conflict experiences – but this 
tentative conclusion based on non-conditional observation of post-conflict RER behavior 
will be revisited in the next section when we analyze the RER behavior in a multivariate 
context, identifying the magnitude and determinants of RER misalignment. 
 
Table 1 reports evidence on correlations between the RER, ODA, and the terms of trade 
(TOT) for each of the post-conflict countries in our sample. ODA and the RER are either 
not significantly correlated or negatively correlated in 30 of our 36 countries. The failure 
of the RER to appreciate with aid may be explained by the omission of other RER 
fundamentals, like the TOT.
14 However, perhaps due to accelerated economic 
diversification experienced by these economies as agents disengage from their 
subsistence hedging strategies
15, most countries did not experience significant TOT 
losses after attaining peace
16. Hence there is no systematic evidence of a significant 
correlation between TOT and aid. Moreover, TOT and RER are positively correlated only 
in less than half of our sample of post-conflict countries. 
 
Now we focus in more detail on the experiences of seven conflict countries: Burundi, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, and Uganda. Figure 3 exhibits the 
evolution of the share of ODA inflows to GDP, the TOT, and the RER before and after 
the start of peace. We start by describing the country dynamics of aid over the conflict 
cycle. In Burundi and Ethiopia aid flows started at high levels during PeaceOnset but 
                                                 
14 TOT deterioration is empirically often associated with a depreciating RER although theoretically the 
relation between TOT and RER is ambiguous (Gavin, 1990).      
15 Institutions for contract enforcement break down during civil war, pushing people to engage mostly in 
subsistence activities, avoiding transaction-intensive activities, including exports. As the latter institutions 
are restored following the end of conflicts, the post-conflict economy starts to diversify again (Collier, 
1999).  
16 In our sample, there was no significant long term trend in the TOT for 31 out of 35 countries during the 
ten years of post-conflict.   
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reached their peak during PostConfl2 and PostConfl1, respectively. On the other hand, 
ODA peaked right from the start of peace in Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, El 
Salvador, and Uganda. For the first three countries, ODA was unusually large right from 
the PeaceOnset period, and even after precipitously declining over the rest of the post-
conflict cycle, it remained at high levels, close to 20% of GDP.  
 
In the case of Uganda, donors entered gradually and tended to stay as the peace was 
consolidating; with initial ODA flows averaging a high of 24% of GDP at PeaceOnset, 
then decelerating to about 10% by the fourth year before experiencing a modest surge 
thereafter to reach 14% by the tenth year of peace. Finally, El Salvador provides an 
example of a post-conflict country that was relatively less aid-dependent, where ODA 
flows peaked at 6% of GDP at PeaceOnset but fell to 2% during PostConf2. However, El 
Salvador is also one of the highest private remittance-receiving countries. Salvadoran 
worker remittances were already very high at PeaceOnset and grew to 14% of GDP at the 
end of PostConf2.   
 
This unconditional country evidence depicted in Figure 3 suggests mixed evidence on 
Dutch disease in response to the important surge in ODA flows. In the case of Burundi, 
Rwanda, Uganda, and, especially, Ethiopia, there is no clear association between aid 
flows and RER appreciation. On the other hand, Nicaragua, El Salvador and, to a lesser 
extent, Mozambique, represent cases of high ODA and appreciating RERs. 
 
Further descriptive evidence on performance measures related to the spending/saving 
pattern of aid of the seven countries is summarized in Table 2. The data confirms that all 
seven countries were recipients of large ODA flows (and of worker remittances in the 
case of El Salvador) during their 1990s post-conflict experiences. However, 
macroeconomic management of their aid surges appears to be shaped by their varied 
initial conditions and development strategies.  
 
Ethiopia and El Salvador started peace with high domestic debt ratios. Their governments 
used part of their aid in reducing public debt levels, reflected in their declining domestic 
debt ratios. This helped in stabilizing their economies. Ethiopia was not only concerned 
about public debt but also about its RER competitiveness. This led to large reserve 
accumulation, supporting Ethiopia’s significant RER depreciation during post-conflict. 
Although El Salvador reduced its debt ratio significantly, a significant part of aid (and 
private remittances) was used to finance domestic spending, leading to significant RER 
appreciation. 
 
Burundi and Rwanda were also concerned with stabilizing their domestic debt but were 
also concerned about RER competitiveness. Hence both countries used part of their aid to 
repay public debt and finance modest reserve accumulation to preclude large RER 
appreciation. Like Ethiopia and El Salvador, the two latter countries refrained from 
excessive inflation financing.   
 
Finally, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Uganda used part of their aid in replenishing 
reserves to preventing large RER appreciation. Mozambique and Nicaragua resorted to  
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inflation financing, with annual reserve money growth of 19%, leading to higher 
inflation. However, in the case of Uganda, where reserve money grew by an annual 14%, 
inflation was held low. 
 
The assessment of macroeconomic outcomes of aid in the seven country experiences 
suggests that post-conflict countries see aid as an important source for both financing 
post-conflict spending needs and strengthening public-sector financial positions by 
saving part of aid inflows. The latter takes the form of reducing public debt and/or 
hoarding international reserves, which are ways to prevent larger RER appreciation. 
Therefore it does not come as surprise that the evidence on the simple association 
between aid and RER appreciation is very mixed in this sub-sample. Most post-conflict 
aid-recipient countries appear to have exercised the option of not fully absorbing or 
spending aid. All this suggests the absence of large-scale Dutch disease during the post-
conflict cycle. However, we will revisit this preliminary conclusion based on simple 
correlations and unconditional analysis, by focusing next on the behavior of the RER and 
the existence of RER misalignment, and its response to aid surges during post-conflict 
transitions, in a multivariate framework.    
 
3. Real Exchange Rate Misalignment during the Conflict Cycle 
 
The concept of RER equilibrium most commonly used in the literature is based on a 
single-equation reduced-form “behavioral” model of the RER that attempts to account for 
current-account flow variables as well as factors influencing longer-run stock 
equilibrium.
17 The underlining notion of RER equilibrium in this approach is essentially 
intertemporal, as the path of the equilibrium RER is assumed to be influenced not only by 
the current value of the fundamentals, but also by anticipations regarding the future 
evolution of these variables.
18 
 
Drawing from the general empirical literature on RER behavior, and in particular from 
Elbadawi and Soto (2005), we will specify and estimate an empirical model for the RER. 
Elbadawi and Soto develop a general equilibrium model for a small three-sector open 
economy (with exportable, importable, and non-tradable goods) and a representative 
household that chooses consumption and leisure so as to maximize its welfare. The latter 
is adjusted for the unemployment rate that may or may not be consistent with non-
clearing labor market conditions (i.e. unemployment may be higher than the NAIRU). 
Moreover, the specification of the household and government budget constraints account 
for bond holdings and fiscal transfers, which allows for explicit derivation of portfolio 
                                                 
17 See for example, Clark and MacDonald (1999), Elbadawi (1994), Elbadawi and Soto (1997a,b), Baffes, 
and Elbadawi and O’Connell (1999). 
18 For this concept of equilibrium RER see Edwards (1989) and Elbadawi (1994). An alternative concept is 
the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER), which is the RER path required to achieve 
simultaneous internal and external balance by some date in the medium-term future and maintain balance 
thereafter (Williamson, 1994). Internal balance is defined by domestic and foreign output levels consistent 
with non-accelerating inflation-rate unemployment, while external balance is given by the sustainable net 
flow of resources between countries, provided that internal balance is maintained. Therefore the FEER 




and stock equilibrium variables as determinants of the RER equilibrium. Therefore this 
model accounts for standard RER fundamentals (such as TOT, productivity differentials, 
trade openness, and government consumption) as well as other RER determinants that are 
not frequently considered by the literature. The latter include a model-consistent measure 
of sustainable imports, consistent with the restriction that net foreign assets should be 
zero in the long run (the no Ponzi-game condition), i.e., that the current account should 
be zero in present-value terms.
19 Another non-conventional RER fundamental included in 
this model is taxes on non-traded goods, which enters the government budget constraint.  
This is because the model assumes that the government collects taxes not just from traded 
goods, as in the conventional RER literature, but also from the consumption of non-
traded goods and of inflation.  
This model predicts the equilibrium RER to be more appreciated when production in the 
traded-goods sector is relatively more efficient than in the non-traded sector. Higher TOT 
(especially if associated to higher real prices for exports) and higher government 
expenditure on non-traded goods (such as government consumption) lead to equilibrium 
RER appreciation. On the other hand, a more open trade regime requires a more 
depreciated equilibrium RER. Regarding the non-traditional RER fundamentals, the 
model predicts that higher taxes on non-traded goods leads to a more appreciated 
equilibrium RER, provided that the weight of traded goods in domestic consumption is 
lower than the labor intensity in the non-traded sector. This is because such taxes would 
lower supply of, more than they would lower the demand for, non-traded goods. Finally, 
a higher level of sustainable imports is predicted to lead to more appreciated RER. 
While the Elbadawi and Soto model addresses some of the major critiques of the 
empirical real exchange rate literature, most notably the lack of an explicit and model-
consistent concept of a sustainable current-account balance, the estimation of the latter is 
highly demanding in terms of time-series data. This is a major constraint for our focus on 
low-income aid-dependent countries. Moreover, while their framework – based on a 
sustainable current-account balance – is useful for undertaking a theoretically-consistent 
analysis of the determinants of the long-run equilibrium RER, it abstracts from critical 
medium-term policy issues, associated with private net capital flows and foreign reserve 
accumulation. Consequently, we estimate a version of their model, consistent with a 
medium-term concept of the sustainable current account, by including foreign aid net of 
changes in foreign reserves held by the monetary authority, net foreign income from 
abroad, and net private capital inflows.  A sustainable increase in any of the three latter 
components would lead to an equilibrium RER appreciation. 
 
                                                 
19 This is given by an expression of future discounted export proceeds minus debt service plus transfers 
(e.g. aid and remittances). The failure to explicitly account for this feature as an endogenous outcome of 
RER models is one of the most fundamental problems of the empirical RER literature discussed by 
Edwards and Savastano (1999).        
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Therefore, we specify the following equation for the RER: 
 
(1) 
01 2 3 4
56 7 8
log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )
log( )
it i it it it
it it it it it
RER TOT PROD OPEN GOV
TAX AID NFI NPC
β ββ β β
ββ β β ε
=+ + + +
++ + + +
 
 
where subscripts i and t represent country and time indexes, respectively; TOT is the 
terms of trade; PROD stands for productivity proxied by the ratio of income per capita in 
country i relative to the OECD average; OPEN represents trade openness computed as 
the residual from a regression of  trade as a share of GDP on geography variables (e.g. 
land area of a country, landlockedness)
20; GOV is the share of government consumption 
on GDP; TAX corresponds to taxes on non-traded goods; AID denotes ODA as a share of 
GDP net of changes in foreign exchange reserves; NFI denotes net foreign income as a 
share of GDP; and NPC corresponds to net private capital inflows as a share of GDP. 
Finally,  0i β  and  it ε  are country-specific intercepts and a disturbance term, respectively. 
 
We estimate equation (1) for a world sample of annual data for 83 countries (including 36 
post-conflict countries) for the 1980-2004 period. Data definitions and sources are 
summarized in Appendix B. Table 3 reports the results for the pooled mean group model 
(PMG), as well as results based on mean group (MG) and dynamic fixed-effects (DFE) 
estimation methods
21. The PMG estimator can be seen as a restricted-model estimator, in 
the sense that it imposes the restriction that all countries share the long-run coefficients, 
against the more general model that assumes that economies differ in their short and 
long-run parameters. However, the PMG estimator is more general than the individual-
effects panel-data model, which assumes that all parameters are constant across countries. 
This restriction can be tested by performing Hausman tests. The null hypothesis of 
equality of coefficients can be rejected at the 1% level, except for productivity and 
foreign aid (net of international reserves), for which the null hypothesis can be rejected at 
the 10% level. This evidence favors the PMG model against the MG estimator. 
 
The PMG results show that all parameters are highly significant (exceeding 99% 
confidence levels) and display expected signs according to theory. The PMG results 
dominate those based on the alternative estimators, consistent with the results reported by 
Elbadawi and Soto (2005) and comparable to the results found in the existing literature.
22 
The semi-elasticities of net foreign income and foreign aid (net of reserve accumulation) 
are equal to 0.004 and 0.002, respectively. The estimated elasticity for the tax on non-
tradables is substantial – i.e. 2.3.  
                                                 
20 This residual measure of openness nets out natural openness and therefore is a better proxy for policy-
oriented openness. 
21 The inclusion of the capital inflows variable is problematic, as it significantly worsens the results for the 
DFE model, which is used as a benchmark for the PMG model. Therefore we dropped it from the model, 
partly also to reduce the dimensionality of the PMG and increase regression precision. 
22 Comparable findings in the literature, include Chinn (1997) for productivity; Elbadawi and Soto (1997) 






Regarding the speed of adjustment and the short-term elasticities, the results in Table 3 
also show that there are marked differences among estimation techniques. Unlike the 
other two regression methods, the results for the PMG model suggest that some 
fundamentals like terms of trade and productivity have highly significant short-run 
effects.  
 
The most important parameter in the estimation of short-run dynamics is the coefficient 
of the equilibrium RER correction term, which measures the speed of adjustment of the 
real exchange rate to its equilibrium level. The estimated average adjustment parameter is 
-0.20, which is equal to the one obtained by Edwards (1989) using a partial adjustment 
model for a group of 12 developing countries. The PMG coefficient estimate is, however, 
smaller than that obtained by the DFE model (at -0.25) and much smaller compared to the 
MG estimate of -0.70. The PMG estimate is also much smaller than coefficients obtained 
from time-series models. This suggests that, like other panel regressions, the PMG model 
might understate the true level of the convergence parameter because it fails to capture 
short-run heterogeneity across countries.
23 
 
Using our model results and following Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Soto (2006), now we 
proceed to construct indexes for the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) and real 
exchange rate misalignment (rermis). The ERER index is obtained from the estimated 
model with the permanent components of the fundamentals (estimated with the Hodrick-
Prescott procedure) substituted into the estimated RER equation. The permanent 
components of the fundamentals are characterized as sustainable levels and are therefore 
consistent with the concept of RER equilibrium. The ERER index is normalized (through 
the country-specific intercept) so that the average RER misalignment (the mean 
logarithmic difference between the RER and ERER for each country) is set equal to zero. 
This imposes the plausible identification condition that no country is allowed to be 
misaligned for the full estimation period. The log of the resulting normalized ERER is 




The first four rows of Table 4 provide the median estimates of RER misalignment over 
the post-conflict cycle for the sample of post-conflict countries. The table also reports a 
breakdown of rermis into one component (labeled Fundamentals) due to the discrepancy 
of observed fundamentals from their-long term sustainable trends and a second 
component (labeled error correction) due to short-term policy or structural shocks to 
fundamentals. The next columns summarize the effects due to policy-oriented 
fundamentals and those associated with structural fundamentals, including ODA. The 
final column reports the separate contribution of ODA. 
                                                 
23 However, unlike other panel regression models, the possible failure of the PMG to account for 
short-run country heterogeneity is likely to be because of the inadequacy of the time-series dimension 
of the data, since the model does not impose restrictions on short-run parameters.     
 





Our rermis estimates suggest that the median post-conflict country entered peace with a 
mildly undervalued exchange rate observed during the 4 PrePeace years, reflected by a 
rermis of -1%. However after peace is started, the median post-conflict country 
experiences a moderate RER overvaluation of 11% during PeaceOnset and 10% during 
PostConf1. RER overvaluation is substantially reduced – to 4% – during PostConf2.  
 
Foreign aid does not appear to have contributed directly to RER overvaluation during the 
conflict cycle. The reason is straightforward. While ODA increased during the post-
conflict period, peaking during PeaceOnset in the median country (as documented 
above), the deviation of post-conflict ODA from permanent ODA flows was not very 
large. However,  ODA is likely to have contributed to the large error-correction 
component, which comes to about 11% during PeaceOnset and PostConf1 and 6% 
during PostConf2. 
 
Now we turn to rermis and its decomposition in each of the seven individual post-conflict 
countries that we focused on in the preceding section. The lower part of Table 4 reports 
estimates of average RER misalignment and its breakdown, separately for each country 
and conflict sub-period, comparable to those reported above for the median post-conflict 
country. The pattern of rermis varies strongly from country to country. Burundi and 
Uganda experienced RER over-appreciation during most of the pre and post-peace sub-
periods. By contrast, Ethiopia was substantially overvalued after the war ended but 
achieved a major correction in the PostConfl1 period and brought the RER close to 
equilibrium in the PostConf2 period. The remaining countries – El Salvador, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Rwanda – shifted from significant RER undervaluation in 
PrePeace to significant RER overvaluation at subsequent periods. Among the latter 
countries, RER overvaluation ranges from 6% in Nicaragua to a very large 41% in El 
Salvador during PostConf2. 
 
High aid flows did not contribute substantially to rermis in any of the seven individual 
countries. (The exception is aid in Mozambique during PeaceOnset, but during the two 
subsequent sub-periods the country experienced substantial undervaluation). This finding 
is broadly consistent with the evidence of a miniscule contribution of large aid flows in 
the median post-conflict country during the post-conflict cycle. 
 
Summing up, there is evidence of moderate RER overvaluation observed in the median 
post-conflict experience, particularly during PeaceOnset and PostConf1 sub-periods. Aid, 
however, does not contribute significantly and directly to RER overvaluation in the 
average aid-receiving country and in the seven country cases that we reviewed in more 
detail. The reason is that aid, while peaking during PeaceOnset, does not deviate 
massively from its permanent values during post-conflict periods. 
 
4. Catch-up Growth in Post-Conflict  
 
A general result from the recent cross-country econometric research on aid effectiveness 
is that aid does not generally influence economic performance, most notably economic  
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growth. However, when aid is delivered to countries that feature a good policy 
environment, it may increase growth but its effect is subject to diminishing returns (e.g. 
World Bank, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000).
25  The issue of aid effectiveness has also 
been studied in the context of post-conflict transitions, where relative to normal peaceful 
environments, aid was found to be super-effective (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2002).  This 
is because civil wars are characterized by an immediate and substantial decline of output, 
and when they last long enough they can also destroy the physical, human, and social 
capital of affected countries.
26 Therefore economies tend to experience drastic under-
performance during war years, which opens up a large potential for post-conflict catch-up 
growth, mainly driven by aid-financed reconstruction and recovery efforts.    
 
Unlike Collier and Hoeffler, who emphasize the role of the overall institutional and 
policy environment in enhancing the absorptive capacity of aid at various post-conflict 
periods, we control for the direct growth effects of institutions and other conventional 
growth fundamentals but emphasize the growth and aid-effectiveness consequences of 
RER misalignment. 
 
A strand of the empirical growth literature that accounts for the impact of RER 
misalignment finds robust negative association between RER overvaluation and growth.  
While moderate undervaluation might support growth, extreme undervaluation also leads 
to less growth (Razin and Collins 1997, Aguirre and Calderon, 2005). Another finding of 
this literature is that the growth impact of RER overvaluation and RER volatility is 
contingent on the level of financial development; they generally reduce growth in 
countries with low levels of financial development while having no significant effect in 
financially advanced economies (Aghion et al., 2006). 
 
Next we specify and estimate an empirical growth model that nests the four latter strands 
of the growth literature: conflict periods, aid, RER competitiveness, and financial 
development, as well as their possible interactions. Controlling for conventional growth 
determinants that are robustly identified in the empirical cross-country growth literature, 
we address the following issues that have not been addressed in aid and post-conflict 
transition literature yet. First, which are the separate effects of peace and post-conflict 
periods, aid, RER misalignment, and financial development, on growth? Second, does aid 
reduce or augment the impact of RER misalignment on growth? Third, does aid increase 
the contribution of post-conflict peace to growth? Finally, is the growth loss from RER 
misalignment ameliorated by financial development?   
 
To address these questions, we specify and estimate the following growth model: 
 
                                                 
25 More recent work by Radelet, Clements and Bhavnani (2003) argues for the need to disaggregate aid by 
its purpose in order to accurately assess its impact on economic growth. They find that the growth impact 
of disaggregated aid flows is larger than previously found (although it presents diminishing returns) 
regardless of recipient countries’ policy environment. This research direction path, although appealing, 
goes beyond the scope of our current work.   
26 For example, Collier (1999) estimates a growth model that accounts for duration and legacy of civil wars. 
He finds that, relative to the counterfactual of peace, the marginal effect of a civil war causes per capita 
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where i and t are country and time indexes, respectively; y is per-capita GDP growth;  A 
is ODA as a share of GDP, 
27 RERMIS is RER misalignment, PC is a vector of three 
post-conflict period variables (Peace Onset takes the value of 1 if the year of peace falls 
within that period, Post-conflict 1 takes the value of 1 if the war ended in the previous 
period, and Post-conflict 2 takes the value of 1 if the war ended two periods before); FD 
is a measure of financial development, CV is a set of standard control variables that are 
robustly associated with cross-country growth (initial per capita GDP, initial GDP 
cyclical component, inflation, government expenditure as a share of GDP, human capital 
investment, a rule of law index, and a measure of trade openness); and t μ  and  i η  are time 
and country fixed-effects, respectively.  
 
Policy fundamentals are likely to be jointly determined with growth as well as responsive 
to future anticipated growth performance. Therefore, to properly account for endogeneity 
and country-specific unobserved characteristics, we use the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) system dynamic panel estimation method. We apply it to a world data 
panel of 78 countries, comprised by post-conflict and other developing economies, as 
well as industrial countries, for 5-year non-overlapping averages spanning the period 
1970 until 2004. The system GMM (developed in Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell 
and Bond, 1997) implemented here, uses lagged values of the dependent and independent 
variables as instrument (called ‘internal instruments’) and combines regressions in 
differences with the regressions in levels to better address the issue of weak 
instrumentation often attributed to the older, difference estimator. Under the assumed 
moment conditions, the system GMM accounts for the combined problems of 
endogeneity and unobserved country effects.  The consistency of the GMM system 
estimator is assessed by two specification tests. The Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions tests the overall validity of the instruments. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis gives support to the model. The second test examines the null hypothesis that 
the error term is not serially correlated. Again, failure to reject the null hypothesis gives 
support to the model. Rejecting the null hypothesis would imply that the instruments are 
inappropriate and would call for higher-order lags of the variables to be used as 
instruments.  
 
The regression results along with the Sargan and the serial-correlation tests are reported 
in Table 5. The first column reports the results of estimating equation (2) excluding the 
interaction terms, the second column reports the results using the full specification, and 
                                                 
27 The values for official development assistance are set equal to zero for the OECD countries. Aid is 
measured at the beginning of each period as it is believed to be more relevant for current growth because 
the overwhelming evidence (reviewed in the previous section) seems to suggest that recipient countries 
tend to absorb and/or spend aid with some time lag. Beginning of period aid is also likely to be exogenous 




column 3 reports a more parsimonious regression which excludes non-significant 
variables. In general, all standard growth fundamentals have the expected sign and are 




The results reported in column of Table 5 show that aid is positively but non-
monotonically associated with growth. RER misalignment has a negative effect on 
growth. The baseline regression results also suggest that there is evidence of a direct 
peace dividend in the Post-conflict 1 and 2 periods but not in the immediate post-conflict 
period of Peace-onset. The marginal effects of Post-conflict 1 and 2 periods on growth 
are large – 1.6% and 2.1%, respectively. The measure of financial development is not 
statistically significant in this specification. 
  
When we allow for interaction terms, the direct effect of RER misalignment strengthens, 
while the direct effects of post-conflict variables become insignificant (column 2 of Table 
5). As expected, the interaction between RER misalignment and aid has a negative and 
significant effect on growth, while aid has an additional positive marginal effect on 
growth in the Post-conflict 1 and 2 periods. Under this specification, we find that 
financial development has a positive and significant effect on growth and, in addition, 
neutralizes in part the negative impact of RER misalignment.  
 
The latter results corroborate two key results about aid effectiveness. First, aid is more 
effective in a good policy environment, which in our case implies avoiding RER 
overvaluation. Second, aid effectiveness is subject to diminishing returns. Moreover, the 
results also support the view that aid is super-effective in post-conflict. Finally, our 
findings suggest that financial development not only improves growth directly but also 
ameliorates the negative repercussions of RER overvaluation. The more parsimonious 
regression results in column 3 of Table 5 confirm the latter evidence. 
 
We can use the results of column 3 to probe deeper into the analysis of RER 
misalignment on growth. From equation (2), note that the overall growth effect of a 
change in RER misalignment is given by the following expression: 
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where β2  is the direct effect of RER misalignment on growth, and β5 A and β7  FD are the 
non-linear effects of RER misalignment on growth that depend on the levels of aid and 
financial development. The estimated parameters suggest that the direct effect of half a 
standard deviation change in RER misalignment would amount to about a 5% loss in 
economic growth. In addition, if aid and financial development were held at their median 
                                                 
28 An alternative approach to identifying growth determinants can be based on regressing current per capita 
growth rates on lagged right-hand side variables by assuming that, aside from lagged income per capita, all 
other time-varying growth fundamentals are exogenous. This could be useful in minimizing the number of 
variables to be instrumented. However, the validity of this simpler approach hinges on a more restrictive 




values, the indirect effects of misalignment would amount to a loss of nearly 0.5% and a 
gain of nearly 5%, respectively. Nevertheless, many of the post-conflict countries are 
highly dependent on aid and have rather shallow financial markets. In order to reflect 
such reality and obtain more realistic scenarios, we perform three exercises. First, we 
investigate the effects of RER misalignments on growth under different levels of aid 
dependency, and under different levels of financial development. Finally, we calculate 
the impact on growth of an enhanced financial sector under different levels of RER 
misalignment. 
 
In the first exercise, we assume that a shock of a one standard deviation affects the RER 




percentiles of the distribution of ODA in the Post-conflict 1 period, and holding the level 
of financial development at its median value in the Post-conflict 1 period for the countries 
in our regression sample. Countries with low aid dependency (close to the 25
th percentile) 
correspond to Egypt and Thailand in recent years while high aid-dependent countries 
(close to the 75
th percentile) are Mali and Senegal in recent years. Figure 4 depicts the 
impact of such scenarios on economic growth. As evidenced by the figure, the level of 
aid plays an important role in the ability of RER misalignment to affect growth. A one-
standard-deviation change in RER misalignment would lower growth by nearly 1% under 
a low-aid scenario and by 2.5% under a high-aid scenario.  
 
Figure 4 also shows the growth impact of the same change in RER misalignment but 
under various levels of financial development, while holding aid at its median value in 
the Post-conflict 1 sample. Post-conflict countries present large heterogeneity in financial 
market development. A country with low financial development (at the 25
th percentile) is 
Guatemala in the late 1990’s, while a country with high financial development is El 
Salvador in the same period. The simulation results show that the level of financial 
development mitigates some of the detrimental effects of overvaluation. Countries with 
highly developed financial markets face a 0.6% growth reduction as a result of larger 
RER misalignment, while those lagging behind in financial development could face 
lower growth of to 2.4%. Hence financial sector reform can foster economic development 
directly and make growth more resilient to large RER overvaluation. Our final exercise 
assumes that there is a one-standard-deviation shock to financial development under three 
scenarios of RER misalignment (the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentile of RERMIS in the post-
conflict 1 period). The positive impact on growth of an enhanced financial system lies 
between 0.05% and 1.32%, depending on the levels of RER misalignment. 
 
Our three exercises reflect the significant impact of RER misalignment on growth, 
particularly in countries that benefit from high levels of ODA. Our results also show that 
financial sector reform is likely to play a role in preventing a significant part of the 




The evidence presented in this paper has shown that post-conflict countries receive 
substantial aid flows after the start of peace. An aid-recipient government has to decide  
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how much of its aid to spend and to save, which fraction of spending should fall on 
traded and non-traded goods, and which part of saving should be used to build-up 
foreign-currency and domestic-currency public-sector net assets. The latter decisions are 
shaped by domestic economic and political factors, as well as by aid conditionality, 
which depend on country and conflict-specific conditions.  
 
The flow of aid to post-conflict countries appears not to be well synchronized with 
country capacity to absorb aid. While post-conflict countries capacity to absorb aid (i.e., 
the quality of their policies and institutions) is built up only gradually after peace onset, 
the evidence suggests that aid tends to peak immediately after peace is attained and 
decline thereafter. This suggests that the timing of aid is often not optimal; too much aid 
is provided too early and is reduced prematurely. However, aid composition broadly 
reflects post-conflict priorities, with large parts of aid financing social expenditure and 
infrastructure investment. 
 
The evidence shows that many post-conflict countries reduced public debt and increased 
international reserves substantially. The latter forms of saving aid contributed to avoid 
significant RER appreciation in post-conflict countries. The long-term (1970-2000) 
correlation between aid and the RER is either non-significant or negative in 29 out of 32 
conflict countries. All this partial evidence suggests little prima-facie evidence of Dutch 
disease during post-conflict surges – but more systematic multivariate evidence is 
required to assess the sensitivity of RERs to aid flows.       
 
We have provided the latter evidence from an error-correction model for the RER, based 
on conventional and non-conventional determinants, including foreign aid. The empirical 
results – based on a world sample of 1980-2004 annual data for 83 countries – point out 
that aid has significant, but small, long-term effects on the RER, controlling for a host of 
policy and structural fundamentals. We used the latter results to compute RER 
misalignment (rermis), breaking it down according to the contribution of deviations of 
fundamentals (including aid) from their long-term trend values and of short-term 
dynamics. Our results point out that the median post-conflict country suffered from 
moderate RER overvaluation after the start of peace, during PeaceOnset and PostConf1 
sub-periods. However, rermis observed during post-conflict periods cannot be traced 
down to the aid flows that peaked during PeaceOnset during this sub-period. Therefore 
large aid flows have not been a major factor in the moderate RER overvaluation observed 
in post-conflict experiences. 
 
The empirical evidence on growth in the world presented in this paper reveals new 
findings about the pattern of catch-up growth during post-conflicts and the role of some 
key growth determinants of post-conflict growth. Aid is an important determinant of 
growth. Prima facie, there is evidence of a large peace bonus earned in years 2-9 after the 
start of peace. However, this evidence on the direct linear effects of peace on growth 
fades away when considering the interaction between foreign aid and post-conflict 
periods, which shows that it is the latter interaction that matters significantly for growth. 
Hence peace per se does not improve growth – it only affects growth when combined 




In the world sample, RER misalignment has a large, negative, linear effect on growth. As 
post-conflict periods have been characterized by moderate RER overvaluation, the latter 
has reduced post-conflict growth. Moreover, aid and RER overvaluation have a combined 
negative growth effect. However, the negative growth effects of RER overvaluation 
decline to a large extent with financial development. Hence financial reform has an 
additional bonus not much considered before: it might neutralize a significant part of the 
negative growth effect of RER misalignment. 
 
 
Some Policy Implications 
 
Our results lead to the following inferences for the management of aid and the conduct of 
macroeconomic and structural policies in the years following attainment of peace. Peaks 
of aid inflows at peace onset and shortly thereafter have been observed in many post-
conflict cases – an experience that donor and recipient countries should agree to avoid in 
the future. Spreading out aid commitments over longer future horizons has the benefit of 
bringing actual aid flows closer to permanent aid flows, so that spending aid will be more 
consistent with permanent aid resources. Moreover, as building up the quality of policies 
and policy institutions is a gradual process after peace onset, aid flows should increase 
with the latter domestic improvements in order to maximize aid effectiveness. This 
recommendation is based on our results on aid effectiveness: the largest growth impact of 
aid is during years 6-9 after the start of peace. 
 
What should be done with aid resources? Here a fine balance has to be struck between the 
goal of spending aid quickly on high-priority social programs – including humanitarian 
aid, social sectors, and infrastructure recovery – and the objective of saving part of aid by 
building up public-sector net assets (accumulating foreign reserves or reducing public-
sector debt). As time passes and public-sector net assets attain acceptable levels, a rising 
share of aid resources should be spent, in accordance with expected sustainable aid flows. 
This (shifting) balance should be the result of equilibrating government objectives of 
assistance to conflict victims and poverty reduction, and supporting macroeconomic 
stabilization (i.e., attaining fiscal sustainability, low inflation, and international 
competitiveness). However, maintaining a strong policy focus on the latter objectives 
without succumbing to domestic political pressures and ad hoc donor conditionality goals 
represents a serious challenge to post-conflict governments. 
 
Our results on moderate RER overvaluation in post-conflict periods and its negative 
impact on growth lead to the following inference on policies in support of strong 
international competitiveness. Some policy handles that are available to post-conflict 
governments to avoid RER overvaluation are in the realm of fiscal policy. They point 
toward keeping under control overall government spending and taxation of non-traded 
goods and services. Avoiding excessive government spending has the added benefit of 
raising short and long-term growth, both directly (shown by our results, confirming 
previous studies) and indirectly by reducing RER overvaluation (shown by our results). 
Authorities should also limit government expenditure volatility and keeping the primary  
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non-aid deficit within limits consistent with expected sustainable aid flows. This should 
contribute to ensure that the RER follows a path that is consistent with equilibrium 
behavior. Other fiscal measures in support of international competitiveness are related to 
the composition of government expenditure. For example, government programs in 
support of agriculture – a key traded-goods sector in many poor post-conflict economies -
- such as improving rural infrastructure, credit access, and marketing, will contribute to 
competitiveness and enhance economic diversification. 
 
In the realm of structural policies, our results suggest that financial development and 
deepening – including banking and capital-market development – has a direct positive 
effect on long-term growth and an additional positive growth bonus by reducing the 
adverse growth impact of RER overvaluation. Therefore the promotion of financial 
development and deepening should be high on the priority of post-conflict government 
policies. This would include strengthening domestic banking (by adopting banking laws 
based on prudential regulation and supervision at high international standards) and 
supporting development of domestic capital markets.  
 
If post-conflict central banks adopt more flexible exchange-rate regimes, moving away 
from pegs or intermediate regimes of limited flexibility, this may strengthen monetary 
policy but may also increase short and medium-term exchange-rate volatility. In order to 
minimize the costs of ensuing RER uncertainty for domestic producers, governments and 
central banks should promote market development of foreign-exchange hedging 
instruments (like futures and other options) through adoption of appropriate financial 
regulation and possibly engaging initially in the supply of the latter financial instruments 
in support of their development. 
 
Finally, our results show that trade openness contributes significantly to a more 
depreciated exchange rate and raises growth through two channels: directly and indirectly 
by reducing the likelihood of RER misalignment. Therefore trade reform should also be 
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Table 1. Long-run Correlations of Aid, Real Exchange Rates (RER), and Terms of 
Trade (TOT) in Post-Conflict Countries 
Country  Corr. (RER, Aid)Corr. (RER, TOT)  Corr. (TOT, Aid) 
Argentina -0.28  0.74  -0.30 
Bangladesh 0.11  0.90  0.22 
Burundi  -0.80 0.33  -0.50 
Central African Rep.  0.17  0.47  0.78 
Chad -0.19  0.57  -0.61 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Of  -0.42  0.50  0.50 
Congo, Rep. Of  0.34  0.62  -0.41 
Egypt 0.18  -0.38  0.15 
El Salvador  -0.96  0.03 -0.23 
Ethiopia -0.10  -0.07  -0.23 
Guatemala  -0.61  -0.42 0.21 
Guinea-Bissau 0.12  -0.59  0.14 
Indonesia  0.99  0.73 -0.08 
Iran -0.52  0.87 -0.62 
Israel 0.37  0.00  -0.26 
Jordan  0.72 0.63  0.57 
Kenya  -0.59 0.61  -0.34 
Mali 0.26  0.26  0.36 
Morocco  -0.86 0.63  -0.34 
Mozambique  -0.55  0.23 -0.07 
Namibia -0.41  -0.20  -0.71 
Nicaragua -0.26  0.79 -0.53 
Nigeria  -0.66 0.74  -0.66 
Pakistan 0.38  0.50 0.54 
Peru 0.01  0.36  -0.73 
Rwanda  0.50 0.71  0.25 
Senegal 0.15  -0.19  0.25 
Sierra Leone  0.91  0.35 -0.01 
South Africa  -0.82 0.69  -0.70 
Sri Lanka  -0.60 -0.64  0.10 
Sudan  0.67 0.79  0.64 
Syria 0.51  -0.04  0.10 
Thailand  0.66  0.28 0.00 
Turkey -0.04  0.14  -0.72 
Uganda -0.28  0.24  -0.71 
Zimbabwe  -0.74 -0.46  0.21 
           
Average correlation  -0.07  0.30  -0.10 
Standard deviation  0.54  0.44  0.44 
Note: 
  Values in bold indicate that the correlation is significant at the 10 percent level. 
  The table is based on all the conflict countries that have RER misalignment data.  









































Burundi 1988-95 0-7 24.6  8.4  -2.0  7.5  14.5  9.7 8.8 
Ethiopia 1992-96 1-5 15.5  41.8  -26.1  5.2  11.3  5.3 22.4 
Mozambique 1996-01 4-9  25.8  -  -  19.4  7.6  13.7  13.8 
Nicaragua 1993-04 3-14  19.2  -  -  19.1  11.3 10.0  9.7 
Rwanda 1998-03 4-9 18.8  13.7  -9.9  4.3  4.3 3.4 9.7 
El Salvador  1992-01 0-9  14.8  * 41.6  -36.2  3.5  2.8  3.8  -0.1 
Uganda 1995-01 3-9  12.3    3.5  1.9  13.9  9.3  4.8 8.3 





































Table 3. Long and Short-Term Determinants of the Real Exchange Rate in the 
World 
Estimators: Pooled mean group, Mean group, and Dynamic fixed effects (all controlling 
for country and time effects) 
Dynamic specification: ARDL(1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1) 
Sample: annual data, 1980-2004 
  
Pooled Mean 
Group  Mean Group  Hausman Tests 
Dynamic Fixed 
Effects 
Variables  Coef. St.  Er. Coef. St.Er.  h-test p-val  Coef. St.Er. 
Long-Run Coefficient            
Terms of Trade, logs  0.208  0.031  0.688  1.038  0.740  0.390  0.078  0.055 
Productivity,  logs  0.518 0.017 0.315 0.113  3.300 0.070 0.560 0.040 
Trade Openness  -0.558  0.031  -0.337  0.193  1.340  0.250  -0.454  0.047 
Government Consumption/GDP, logs  2.625  0.258  -23.496 23.438 1.240  0.270  0.227  0.399 
Net Foreign Income/GDP  0.004  0.002  0.071  0.072  0.870  0.350  0.013  0.003 
Foreign Aid Net of Int'l Reserves/GDP  0.002  0.001  -0.007  0.005  3.410  0.060  0.002  0.002 
Taxes on Non-traded Goods, logs  2.031  0.403  8.550  7.317  0.800  0.370  1.102  0.730 
                          
Error Correction Coefficients                   
Phi  -0.20 0.02 -0.70 0.04          -0.25 0.01 
Short-Run Coefficients           
D(Terms of Trade, logs)  0.082  0.037  -0.028  0.035      0.009  0.022 
D(Productivity,  logs)  0.429 0.029 0.195 0.043      0.392 0.020 
D(Net  Foreign  Income/GDP)  0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003      0.001 0.001 
D(Taxes on Non-traded Goods, logs)  0.447  0.470  -0.486  0.489      1.093  0.317 
Intercept  0.021  0.029  0.014  0.099             
No. of countries  83  83      83 
No. Observations  1875  1875        1875 
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Table 4. Real Exchange Rate Misalignment (rermis) and its Decomposition in Post-
conflict Countries  
  






of which foreign 
development 
assistance net of 
int'l reserves/GDP
Group Medians:           
 Pre-peace  -1.03 -0.74 0.61 -0.75 -0.56 0.00
 Peace  onset  10.56 1.79 11.21 1.27 0.90 11.00
 Post-conflict  1  10.25 0.68 10.52 -0.16 0.16 0.11
   Post-conflict 2  3.89 2.17 5.51 -0.15 1.18 0.02
Country Specific: 
Burundi  Pre-peace 35.64 15.33 17.07 3.16 10.96 -0.27
  Peace onset  11.10 6.35 2.76 5.07 3.43 0.52
  Post-conflict 1  4.22 -0.86 5.61 -3.47 2.22 1.22
   Post-conflict 2  10.67 6.39 4.91 2.50 3.69 0.92
El Salvador  Pre-peace -7.49 1.62 -9.11 3.83 -5.85 0.42
  Peace onset  1.17 -3.61 4.77 -3.12 -1.44 0.01
  Post-conflict 1  24.68 0.68 24.89 -3.75 3.03 -0.09
   Post-conflict 2  41.07 7.53 34.78 -0.20 6.19 0.09
Ethiopia  Pre-peace 5.16 4.68 0.26 10.09 -2.86 0.35
  Peace onset  42.50 30.82 11.67 21.91 6.87 -0.06
  Post-conflict 1  -16.57 -18.40 0.86 -7.74 -14.07 0.37
   Post-conflict 2  -1.60 5.91 -6.08 4.63 0.87 -0.22
Mozambique  Pre-peace -11.14 -23.85 7.00 -10.30 -9.34 1.30
  Peace onset  -19.36 -33.84 14.48 -15.96 -15.53 6.18
  Post-conflict 1  -4.62 -8.51 7.25 -9.51 -6.54 0.73
   Post-conflict 2  18.11 3.43 11.17 0.96 2.45 -0.17
Nicaragua  Pre-peace 
  Peace onset  -16.74 -26.48 16.81 -14.11 -25.55 2.36
  Post-conflict 1  11.81 0.72 43.92 -0.10 -9.88 -0.23
   Post-conflict 2  6.25 3.34 2.45 3.17 32.99 -0.78
Rwanda  Pre-peace -7.81 13.87 -18.46 13.59 -1.79 -1.13
  Peace onset  33.51 3.05 28.97 0.44 1.28 2.46
  Post-conflict 1  26.57 2.86 23.58 1.22 -1.13 0.28
   Post-conflict 2  36.29 9.75 26.55 0.45 10.56 -0.65
Uganda  Pre-peace 
  Peace onset  21.11 5.96 13.65 3.80 2.09 0.38
  Post-conflict 1  11.98 -2.07 13.93 -1.39 43.76 0.24
   Post-conflict 2  6.65 12.07 -6.69 3.49 9.57 0.00
 
Note: * Policy Variables are government consumption/GDP, taxes on non-traded goods, and trade 
openness. ** Structural Variables are terms of trade, productivity, net foreign income/GDP, and official 
development assistance net of int'l reserves/GDP. RER misalignment series and subsequent decompositions 
are based on the estimation results of the pooled mean group estimates of table 3. Countries: see Appendix 








Table 5. Economic Growth and the Role of Aid, RER Misalignment, and Financial 
Development in the World 
Cross-country panel data consisting of non-overlapping 5-year averages spanning 1970-
2004 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita 
Estimation method: GMM-IV system estimator 
    [1]   [2]    [3]    
Control Variables         
Initial GDP per Capita  -0.0050** -0.0037**  -0.0069**
(in logs)  (3.14) (2.02)  (6.10) 
     
Initial GDP per Capita  -0.1300** -0.1404**  -0.1415**
Cyclical Component  (5.83) (8.22)  (8.98) 
     
Inflation  -0.0146** -0.0123**  -0.0128**
(Log of [inflation+100])  (9.26) (7.65)  (12.89) 
     
Government Expenditures/GDP  -0.0185** -0.0164**  -0.0138**
(in logs)  (4.66) (4.14)  (4.37) 
     
Human Capital Investment  0.0235** 0.0171**  0.0228**
(secondary enrollment, in logs)  (7.74) (5.20)  (10.04) 
     
Rule of Law  0.0128** 0.0100**  0.0116**
(from ICRG, 0-6)  (9.12) (5.57)  (8.32) 
    
Trade Openness  0.0197** 0.0143**  0.0137**
(trade volume/GDP, in logs)  (6.93) (5.47) (6.45) 
   
Aid, RERMIS, and Financial Development   
Official Development Assistance/GDP  0.0017** 0.0008**  0.0010**
(beginning of period)  (6.76) (2.31) (3.63) 
   
Official Development Assistance/GDP squared  0.0000** 0.0000*  0.0000**
(beginning of period)  (3.58) (1.78) (2.17) 
   
RER Misalignment  -0.0117** -0.1236**  -0.1044**
(% difference b/w log REER and its equilibrium) (4.53) (5.68)  (5.03) 
     
Peace Onset  0.0077 0.0008  
 (1.48) (0.12)  
   
Post-conflict 1  0.0164** 0.0042  
 (4.82) (0.82)  
   
Post-conflict 2  0.0213** -0.0073  
 (3.31) (0.75)  
   
Financial Development  -0.0005 0.0042**  0.0036**




Table 5. Economic Growth and the Role of Aid, RER Misalignment, and Financial 
Development in the World (cont.) 
   [1]    [2]     [3]    
   
RER*Official Development Assistance  -0.0015**  -0.0018
*
* 
 (2.38) (3.55) 
   
Official Development Assistance*Peace Onset  0.0002  
 (0.54)  
   
Official Development Assistance*Post-conflict 1  0.0008**  0.0008
*
* 
 (3.75) (9.04) 
   
Official Development Assistance*Post-conflict 0.0018**  0.0010
*
* 
 (2.84) (6.37) 
   
RER Misalignment*Financial Depth  0.0321**  0.0279
*
* 
   
Period Shifts  
Intercept (base period: 1975-79)  -0.1132** -0.0881**  -0.0781
*
* 
1980-84 -0.0180** -0.0197**  -0.0176
*
* 
1985-89 -0.0173** -0.0202**  -0.0181
*
* 
1990-94 -0.0215** -0.0213**  -0.0225
*
* 
1995-99 -0.0307** -0.0276**  -0.0294
*
* 
2000-04 -0.0273** -0.0235**  -0.0251
*
* 
            
No. Countries / No. Observations  78/363   78/363      78/363    
           
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)      
 (a) Sargan Test  0.70  0.94    0.89   
 (b) Serial Correlation :         
       Second-Order  0.30  0.20    0.23   
                    
Note: Numbers below coefficients are the corresponding robust standard errors. * (**) denotes 
statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level. Sample: Cross-country panel data consisting of 















































































Humanitarian Government & Institutions
Budget Support Productive
Social  Infrastructure & Communications
 
Note:  The productive sector is made up of agriculture, industry, banking, and business. The social sector is 
made up of education, health, population, and water. The infrastructure and communications sector is made 
up of transport, communications, and energy.  The figure is based on all the conflict countries that have 






Figure 3. Aid (ODA/GDP), Terms of Trade (TOT), and the Real Exchange Rate 































































































































Figure 4.  Impact of a one-standard-deviation Change in Real Exchange Rate (RER) 



















Appendix A: Country and Period Coverage  
  
End of Conflict 
Year(s)  1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Algeria 1962  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Argentina 1977  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Australia   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Austria   √  √  √       
Bangladesh  1997      √  √  √  √ 
Bolivia   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Botswana     √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Brazil       √  √  √  √  
Burkina  Faso        √  √  √  √ 
Burundi  1969,  1972,  1988,  2002        
Cameroon     √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Canada   √  √  √  √  √  √  
Central  African  Republic  1996          
Chad  1997          
Chile     √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Colombia 1966  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Congo  1999,  2002       √  √  √ 
Costa Rica    √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Cote d'Ivoire        √  √  √  √  √ 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1965, 1967, 1978, 2001  √  √  √  √  √  
Denmark   √  √  √  √  √  √  
Dominican Republic  1965  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Ecuador   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Egypt 1997    √  √  √  √  √  √ 
El Salvador  1992      √  √  √  √  √ 
Ethiopia  1991      √  √  √  √ 
Finland       √  √  √  √  
France   √  √  √  √     
Gabon   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Gambia        √  √  √  √ 
Ghana   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Guatemala 1972,  1994      √  √  √  √  √ 
Guinea  Bissau  1999      √  √  √  √ 
Honduras   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
India   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Indonesia 1960,  2002  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Iran  1984         
Ireland   √  √  √  √  √  √  
Israel 1997,  2002      √  √  √  √  √ 
Italy   √  √  √  √  √    
Jamaica     √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Japan       √  √  √    
Jordan 1971    √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Kenya 1967,  1993  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Korea       √  √  √  √  √ 
Madagascar       √  √  √  √  √ 
Malaysia   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Malawi        √  √  √  √ 
Mali  1995      √  √  √  √ 
Mexico       √  √  √  √  √ 
Morocco 1991  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Mozambique  1992      √  √  √  √ 
Namibia  1989          
New Zealand    √  √  √  √  √  √  √  
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Appendix A: Country and Period Coverage (cont.) 
 
End of Conflict 
Year(s)  1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Nicaragua 1979,  1990      √  √  √  √  √ 
Niger        √  √  √  √ 
Nigeria 1970,  1984  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Norway   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Pakistan  1971, 1977, 2002  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Panama       √  √  √  √  √ 
Papua New Guinea  1998    √  √  √  √  √  
Paraguay   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Peru 1996  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Philippines   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Rwanda  1964,  1994,  2001         
Senegal 1999  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Sierra  Leone  2001      √  √  √  √ 
South  Africa  1994          
Sri Lanka  1971, 2002  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Sudan 1972,  2002  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Sweden       √  √  √  √  √ 
Switzerland   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Syria 1982  √  √  √  √      
Thailand 1982  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Togo     √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Trinidad & Tobago      √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Tunisia       √  √  √  √  √ 
Turkey 1999  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Uganda  1966, 1979, 1987, 1992      √  √  √  √ 
United States    √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Uruguay   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Venezuela   √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Zambia        √  √  √  √ 
Zimbabwe  1979, 1987     √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Note: End of conflict years are only reported for those countries for which we have RER misalignment data in the period 1960-04.  
These are used for the analysis in sections1-4 of the paper.  Checkmarks indicate that the country-period combination is included in 
the growth regressions.  
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Appendix B: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
 
Variable     Definition and Construction     Source 
Official Development 
Assistance 
  Ratio of official development assistance (current USD) 
to GDP (current USD). 
 WDI  (2006) 
Emergency Aid        Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD) (2006) 
CPIA    Index that assesses a country’s economic management, 
structural policies, policies for social inclusion/equity, 
and public sector management and institutions.  
 World  Bank 
Sectoral Aid    On a commitment basis    Credit Reporting System (OECD) (2006) 
Real effective exchange 
rate 
  Real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective 
exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency 
against a weighted average of several foreign 
currencies) divided by a price deflator or index of costs.  
  International Financial Statistics, (2006) 
supplemented with internal data from 
IMF Information Notice System.  
Terms of Trade    The terms of trade index shows the national accounts 
exports price index divided by the imports price index. 
  World Development Indicators (2005, 
2006) and Loayza et al. (2005) 
 
Post-conflict Episodes    Pre-peace: years -4  to -1 prior to the end of conflict 
which is denoted as time 0. Peace onset: years 0 and 1; 
post-conflict 1: years 2 until 5; post-conflict 2: years 6 
until 9. 
  Authors’ construction using conflict data 
from Sambanis (2004) and 
complementing them with data from 
armed conflict dataset of PRIO for the 
years 2002-04. www.prio.no 
Debt ratio    Debt/GDP measured in nominal USD.    WDI (2006) 
Growth in reserve money    Log difference of nominal reserve money (local 
currency).  
  International Financial Statistics, (2006). 
Change in reserve ratio    Difference of ratio of international reserves to GDP 
between years t and t-1 
 WDI  (2006) 
Inflation    Inflation as measured by the consumer price index .    WDI (2006) 
Growth in nominal 
exchange rate 
  Log difference of nominal exchange rates between years 
t and t-1 
 WDI  (2006) 
Productivity    Ratio of per capita GDP at factor cost in United States 
dollars over average GDP at factor cost in United States 
dollars for Industrial Countries. 
 
  Authors' construction using World 




  Residual of a regression of the log of the ratio of exports 
and imports (in current local currency units) to GDP (in 
local currency units), on the logs of area and population, 
and dummies for oil exporting and for landlocked 
countries 
 
  World Development Indicators, 2004 and 





  Ratio of government consumption to GDP  (current 
local currency units) 
 
  Authors' construction using International 
Financial Statistics, December 2004 CD-
ROM Release, World Development 
Indicators, 2004, and Africa Live 





Appendix B: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis (cont.) 
  
Variable     Definition and Construction     Source 
Net Foreign Income         
Taxes on Non-traded 
Goods 
 
 Log  [1+taxes/GDP]   World  Development Indicators, 2004, 
Africa Live Database, 2004, and 
Government Finance Statistics, 2004 
 
Variables Used in 
Growth Regressions 
     
GDP per capita growth     Log difference of real GDP per capita.    Authors' construction using data from 
World Development Indicators (WDI), 
The World Bank (2006). 
Initial GDP per capita    Initial value of ratio of total real GDP to total 
population.  
  Authors' construction WDI, The World 
Bank (2006). 
Initial GDP per Capita 
Cyclical Component 
  Difference between the logarithm of actual GDP per 
capita and the logarithm of potential (trend) GDP. The 
Hodrik-Prescott filter was used for the decomposition. 
  Authors' calculations using data from 
WDI (2006) 




  Ratio of government expenditures (in local currency) to 
GDP (in local currency). 
  Data come primarily from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), 2006; when 
missing, they are complemented with data 
from WDI (2006) and UN National 
Accounts Statistics (2006) 
Human Capital 
Investment 
  Ratio of total secondary enrollment, regardless of age, 
to the population of the age group that officially 
corresponds to that level of education.  
  Easterly and Sewadeh (2002), WDI 
(2006), UNESCO (2006). 
Rule of Law    Presence of law and order. Range is between 0 and 6.    International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
Political Risk Services.                   
www.icrgonline.com 
Trade Openness    Ratio of exports and imports (in local currency) to GDP 
(in local currency). 
  Data come primarily from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), 2006; when 
missing, they are complemented with data 
from WDI (2006) and UN National 
Accounts Statistics (2006) 
Real Exchange Rate 
Misalignment 
  Percentage difference between real effective exchange 
rate and its estimated equilibrium value. 
  Authors' calculations. See Appendix C for 
the methodology. 
Post-conflict Episodes    Peace onset: dummy variable equal to 1 for the period 
when the war ended and 0 otherwise; post-conflict 1 and 
2 are the two periods immediately after the end of the 
war 
  Authors’ construction using conflict data 
from Sambanis (2004) and 
complementing them with data from 
armed conflict dataset of PRIO for the 
years 2002-04. www.prio.no 
Financial Depth    Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid liabilities are 
also known as broad money or M3.   
 WDI  (2006) 





Computing the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate and RER Misalignment Indexes 
 
In order to describe our methodology to determine the equilibrium RER it is useful to 
collapse all of its determinants into a category we call fundamentals. Let  it e  be the log of 
the observed real exchange rate for country i in time t. Then we can write the equilibrium 
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where i denotes a country and 
i
t ε  is a stochastic innovation or short-term fluctuation. 
Note that the intercept varies across countries.  
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δ  is a scaled country-specific intercept to be identified below. 
Under the assumption that the model is correctly specified, the real exchange rate 
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The scaled intercept of the equilibrium RER (
i
0 ˆ δ ) must satisfy the following identification 
condition of RER misalignment: 
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t it t F F E rermis E ε β δ δ      (4) 
This condition requires that, for any given country, the expected value of the RER 
misalignment across time must be equal to zero. This is because eventually the RER must 
revert to it equilibrium level; otherwise it will not be “misalignment” but a permanent 
phenomenon. Though the expected value of the transitory components of the 
fundamentals (second right hand side term) should be zero, we do not make that 
restriction to allow for potential misspecification of the decomposition procedure
30. 
                                                 
30 We will show below that the expression for the equilibrium RER is the same whether 
or not we assume the expected values of the transitory fundamentals to be zero. 
Moreover, under the general case, the equation for misalignment generates the one with 




Noting that the first right hand side term is time-invariant, we have the following sample 
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Note that though the panel estimation requires that  [ ] 0 ˆ , =
i
t i t E ε ,  [ ]
i
t t E ε ˆ  is not, in general, 
equal to zero and can be estimated by the mean of the residuals 
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β δ ε ε  (from equation 1). Substituting for the mean 
residual in equation (5), we have the final expression for the equilibrium intercept: 
i i i i i i i F e F F F e
~
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~
( ' ˆ ~
0 β β β δ − = − − + = ,       ( 6 )  
where 
i i i F and F e ~ , , respectively, denote the mean values (over time) of the actual RER, 
the fundamentals, and their corresponding permanent components.  
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This expression states that, for any given country i, the RER equilibrium index must be 
equal to the average of the observed RER over the estimation period plus (minus) a 
component reflecting equilibrium appreciation (depreciation), where an equilibrium 
appreciation (depreciation) is required when the weighted permanent component of the 
fundamentals in time t is larger (smaller) than the corresponding average over the 
estimation period (second right hand side term). 
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31 Under the assumption that  ( ) [ ] 0
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t t F F E β , the corresponding expression for the equilibrium 
intercept is given by 
i i i F e β δ ′ − = ˆ ~





i i F F
n
F F  and the second RHS 
term is equal to zero by assumption/construction, the expression for the intercept is the same under both 
cases. 
Therefore, the expressions for the equilibrium RER (equation 7) as well as misalignment (equation 8) also 
remain the same.  
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Like the equilibrium RER index, the expression for RER misalignment is also very 
intuitive. It suggests that, at any point in time, if the difference between the RER at time t 
and the average RER is in excess of the equilibrium appreciation component the 
exchange rate is overvalued at time t, and the extent of the overvaluation is given by the 
net difference.  This expression also suggests that depending on the size of the 
equilibrium appreciation component, a higher than average real exchange rate is 
compatible with overvaluation (rermis>0), undervaluation (rermis<0) or perfect 
equilibrium (rermis=0).  
If the permanent components of the fundamentals are time-invariant, the second term in 
the RHS of equations 7 and 8 will be zero. The equilibrium RER will, therefore, be equal 
to the mean of the observed RER and the misalignment will be given by the deviation 
from the mean RER.  This will be consistent with a variant of the PPP model. However, 
the PPP restriction is neither corroborated by theory nor the time series characteristics of 
the fundamentals, especially for the case of developing countries. 
Decomposing RER Misalignment 
Equation (8) is all what we need for constructing the equilibrium RER index and the 
corresponding aggregate index of RER misalignment. However, further manipulation of 
this equation would provide further insight for policy analysis. Using equation (1) to 
substitute for the first RHS term of equation 8 we have
32: 
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where a “T” over a variable indicates its “transitory” component. This expression 
suggests that RER misalignment can be accounted for by a fundamental component and 
an error-correction component. For example, the RER will be overvalued in time t if the 
“weighted” transitory component of the fundamentals is larger than the average and that 
deeper than average error-correction is required.  The latter reflects the effect of short-run 
macroeconomic policies, which are not part of the long-run fundamentals but may 








                                                 







 the expression for rermis becomes a special case of equation 8. 